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ABSTRACT
Timing attacks have been a continuous threat to users’ privacy in
modern browsers. To mitigate such attacks, existing approaches,
such as Tor Browser and Fermata, add jitters to the browser clock
so that an attacker cannot accurately measure an event. However,
such defenses only raise the bar for an attacker but do not fun-
damentally mitigate timing attacks, i.e., it just takes longer than
previous to launch a timing attack.
In this paper, we propose a novel approach, called determinis-
tic browser, which can provably prevent timing attacks in modern
browsers. Borrowing from Physics, we introduce several concepts,
such as an observer and a reference frame. Specifically, a snippet
of JavaScript, i.e., an observer in JavaScript reference frame, will
always obtain the same, fixed timing information so that timing
attacks are prevented; at contrast, a user, i.e., an oracle observer,
will perceive the JavaScript differently and do not experience the
performance slowdown. We have implemented a prototype called
DeterFox and our evaluation shows that the prototype can defend
against browser-related timing attacks.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Security and privacy → Browser security; Web application
security;
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1 INTRODUCTION
Timing attacks have continuously posed a threat to modern web
browsers, violating users’ privacy. For example, an adversary can
infer the size of an external, cross-site resource based on the load-
ing time [45, 46]; a website can fingerprint the type of the browser
based on the performance of JavaScript [33, 34]; two adversaries
can talk to each other via a covert channel [38, 45].
Facedwith browser-related timing attacks, researchers fromboth
industry and academia have proposed solutions to mitigate such
attacks by adding noises or called jitters to the time available to
the attackers and decreasing the time precision. For example, Tor
Browser [4], an industry pioneer in protecting users’ privacy, re-
duces the resolution ofper f ormance .now , a fine-grained JavaScript
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clock, to 100ms; following Tor Browser, major browsers, such as
Chrome and Firefox, also reduces the resolution to 5µs. Similarly,
Kohlbrenner and Shacham proposed Fermata [26], a solution that
introduces fuzzy time [21] into browser design and then degrades
not only the explicit clock like per f ormance .now but also other
implicit clocks like setTimeout in the browser.
However, the aforementioned prior work—which reduces the
browser’s clock resolution—only raises the bar for an attacker but
do not fundamentally mitigate timing attacks. Even if such work
is deployed, it just takes longer time for an adversary to launch
an aforementioned timing attack and obtain the information that
she needs. Say, an adversary tries to infer a resource’s size based
on the loading time, i.e., launching a side-channel attack. All the
existing defenses only limit the bandwidth of such a side chan-
nel as acknowledged by Kohlbrenner and Shacham [26]. Consider
JavaScript performance fingerprinting as another example. Jitters
that are added by existing defenses can be averaged out, when the
attack is performed longer or in multiple runs.
Apart from the prior work targeting browser-related timing at-
tacks, another direction that prevents lower-level timing attacks,
such as L2 cache attacks, is to introduce determinism. Examples
of such approaches are Deterland [48], StopWatch [29, 30], and
λPAR
SEC
[50].However, Deterland still adopts statistical, non-deterministic
solutions for external events by grouping events together, which
only limits the bandwidth of an external timing attack. StopWatch
cannot prevent internal timing attacks, and needs virtual machine
replication for I/O events, which is not applicable at a higher level,
such as a browser. λPAR
SEC
is a new programming language with en-
sured security property, but requires that all the existing programs
are rewritten and follow their language specification. In sum, it still
remains unclear how to apply determinism in real-world systems
even at lower level let alone web browsers so as to prevent timing
attacks.
In this paper, we propose deterministic browser, the first ap-
proach that introduces determinism into web browsers and prov-
ably prevents browser-related timing attacks. Both challenges and
opportunities arise in deterministic browser. One challenge is that
JavaScript, the dominant web language, is event-driven, i.e., JavaScript
engine may be waiting for events without executing any state-
ments; accordingly, one opportunity is that JavaScript is singled-
threaded—specifically no event can interrupt the JavaScript execu-
tion.1
1The statement holds, even if we take WebWorkers, a new HTML5 standard, into
consideration.
To better explain deterministic browser, let us revisit timing at-
tacks. A timing attack is that an adversary tries to measure the
duration of a target, secret event (called a “target secret” in the pa-
per) using a reference clock of the physical time. The target secret
is an event that the adversary does not know how long it takes
to finish, e.g., the parsing time of a cross-origin script. The refer-
ence clock is used to measure the target secret, which could be
explicit, e.g., per f ormance .now , or implicit, e.g., setTimeout and
requestAnimationFrame . An implicit reference clock is based on
an event that the adversary knows how long it takes to finish. The
duration of such known event is defined as an implicit clock tick,
usually much smaller than the duration of the target secret.
A necessary condition of launching a successful timing attack is
that all three key elements—i.e., (i) an adversary, (ii) a target secret,
and (iii) a reference clock—have to co-exist at the same time in a
runtime environment. An adversary is the subject, a target secret
is the object, and a reference clock is the tool that the subject used
to steal the object. Therefore, a natural solution is to remove one
or more of the three key elements from the runtime environment
and break the necessary condition. However, all three elements
are essential in a browser and hard to remove. An adversary just
looks like a normal client-side JavaScript. The detection of such
JavaScript is a different research direction and based on past re-
search on JavaScript malware detection [11, 17], false positives and
negatives are hard to avoid. A target secret is a common browser
operation such as script parsing—i.e., the removal of target secrets
will break the browser functionality. We can remove2 an explicit
reference clock of the physical time, such as per f ormance .now ,
but many implicit clocks like setTimeout and using JavaScript ex-
ecution as minor clocks [26] also exist and contribute to essential
browser functionalities.
In deterministic browser, instead of removing key elements from
the entire runtime environment, i.e., the web browser, we break
down the web browser into several smaller units and remove one
or more different key elements from these smaller units. That is,
from a macro perspective, all three key elements still exist in the
web browser; from a micro perspective, at most two elements exist
in one smaller unit. Specifically, the smaller unit that we introduce
is called reference frames (RFs),3 a new, abstract concept borrowed
from Physics. Each RF has one independent clock and sometimes
an observer—e.g., a JavaScript program possibly controlled by the
adversary. Just as in Physics, the job of the observer is to measure
the duration of an event in the RF, i.e., making two observations at
the start and end of the event, obtaining two timestamps and cal-
culating the interval. In web browser, one important yet different
property of a RF is that one and only one event—e.g., a target secret
or an implicit clock tick event—can be executed in one RF; differ-
ent events are executed in different RFs separately. (As discussed
in Section 3.1, RFs are usually implemented by OS level threads.)
We now look at different RF examples and explain how to remove
key elements of a timing attack from these RFs. In general, RFs can
be categorized into two types: with and without a target secret.
2Strictly speaking, because a clock is an essential concept, the so-called removal of a
clock is just to define a new clock in which the ticking unit is zero.
3Note that a reference frame is not an HTML or JavaScript frame: An HTML or
JavaScript frame may contain many reference frames. To avoid confusion, we often
use the abbreviation, i.e., RF, for reference frame in the paper.
First, let us say a RF is executing a target secret—that is, all three
key elements co-exist in this RF. JavaScript execution engine is
such an example, in which the target secret is the execution per-
formance of JavaScript. In such case, we need to redefine the clock
in the RF such that when an observer measures the duration of
any event, it can always calculate the duration based on what it
has already known without looking at the clock. A RF with such a
clock is defined as deterministic (Definition 1) in our paper. Here
our definition of determinism—which provably prevents timing at-
tacks shown in Theorem 1—is broader than the existing definition,
such as the one used inDeterLand [48].We further show that in the
context of JavaScript RF, our definition can boil down to a simple
form (Theorem 2), and then be specialized to the existing definition.
Particularly, the clock in JavaScript RF ticks based on the number
of executed opcodes.
Second, let us say a RF has no target secret, e.g., a RF execut-
ing a tick event for an implicit reference clock. Concrete examples
are like a RF executing setTimeout , one dealing with an HTTP
request, and another executing requestAnimationFrame . In such
cases, only two elements exist in the RF—there is no target secret
for the adversary to steal. That is, the clock in such RFs can fol-
low the physical time. However, the clock information in such RFs
can be communicated to a deterministic RF that has a target secret,
hence being used for measurement. Therefore, when a determin-
istic RF receives information from another (non-deterministic) RF,
we need tomake the recipient RF remain deterministic (Lemma 1)—
the technique of such communication between RFs is defined as de-
terministic communication (Definition 2). Particularly, as shown
in Section 5, we introduce a priority queue to replace the origi-
nal event queue, i.e., the central communication data structure, in
the JavaScript event model. Our new priority queue synchronizes
clocks in two RFs from the viewpoint of the recipient observer. In
other words, when the recipient observer sees the communication
message conveying the time from other RF, e.g., the physical time,
the conveyed time is the same as its own clock.
Apart from the aforementioned categorization of RFs based on
whether a target secret exists, RFs can also be classified based on
the existence of an observer, one with an observer called a main
RF and one without called an auxiliary RF. The clock in a RF is
in an undefined state when an observer is absent, because only
observers can obtain timing information, i.e., making observations.
Then, the clock will become available when the observer is back,
usually when a RF communication happens. For example, when
a JavaScript RF is waiting for an event to finish, the clock in the
JavaScript RF is undefined and determined by the event to finish.
For another example, when a setTimeout RF is waiting for some
amount of time, the clock is also undefined and determined when
the RF communicates with the JavaScript RF.
Another important property of deterministic browser—which
is just similar to Physics—is that different observers perceive dif-
ferent time elapse in their own RFs. For example, the observer in
JavaScript RF, i.e., a snippet of JavaScript code possibly controlled
by an adversary, will always obtain the same performance informa-
tionwhenmeasuring itself so that timing attacks are prevented. At
contrast, an oracle observer, e.g., the user of the browser, will per-
ceive the JavaScript execution just as normal as in a legacy browser
so that she does not experience the performance slowdown aswhat
the JavaScript observer does.
We have implemented a prototype of our deterministic browser
called DeterFox by modifying a legacy Firefox browser. Our eval-
uation shows that DeterFox can defend against browser-related
timing attacks in the literature and is compatiblewith existing web-
sites. Note that our implementation is open-source—the repository
and a video demo can be found at this website (http://www.deterfox.com).
2 THREAT MODEL
We present our threat model from three aspects: in-scope attacks,
a motivating example, and out-of-scope attacks.
In-scope Attacks. In this paper, we include browser-related tim-
ing attacks in our threat model. As described, such attacks are
made possible because an adversary can measure the duration of a
target secret at client-side browsers using a reference clock. The ad-
versary is the client-side JavaScript and the reference clock could
be the physical one defined by per f ormance .now or other implicit
ones, such as setTimeout . The target secret varies according to the
specific attack scenario, and now let us use the following three ex-
amples to explain it.
• JavaScript Performance Fingerprinting. JavaScript performance
fingerprinting [33, 34] is one special case of browser fingerprint-
ing where an adversary executes a certain snippet of JavaScript
code and fingerprints the browser based on how long the execu-
tion takes. In such attacks, the target secret is the performance
of JavaScript execution on the specific machine.
• Inference of Cross-origin Resource via Loading Time. An adver-
sary website may load resources from a third-party website via a
script tag and measure the parsing time by the browser until an
error event is triggered. By doing so, the adversary can infer the
size of the response and thus other private information, such as
the number of Twitter friends [45, 46]. This is also called a tim-
ing side channel attack. In this example, the target secret is the
loading of the cross-origin response, which the adversary does
not know due to the same-origin policy.
• Inference of Image Contents via SVG Filtering. Stone [44] shows
that an adversary can apply an SVG filter on an image and infer
the contents based on how long the filtering process takes. By
doing so, the adversary can steal the pixels of a cross-origin im-
age or browsing history. In this example, the target secret is the
performance of the SVG filter. Note that the reference clock used
in this attack is requestAnimationFrame .
A Motivating Example. Now let us look at a motivating exam-
ple in Figure 1. The example contains two versions of attacks: syn-
chronous (Line 1–21) and asynchronous (Line 22–28) ones. The
synchronous version usesper f ormance .now as the reference clock
and the asynchronous one uses setInterval . We will discuss how
determinism prevents these two versions in Section 4.1.4 and 5.3
respectively.
The synchronous attack (Line 1–21) adopts a so-called clock-
edge technique invented by Kohlbrenner and Shacham [26], which
measures a minor clock, e.g., a simple, cheap JavaScript operation
like count + +, by repeating the operation between two edges of a
major clock, e.g., the physical clock, for multiple times. Then, one
1 function nextEdge () {
2 start = performance .now ();
3 count = 0;
4 do {
5 count ++;
6 } while (start == performance .now ());
7 return count;
8 }
9 function fingerprinting () {
10 nextEdge ();
11 fingerprint = nextEdge ();
12 }
13 function sideChannelSync () {
14 fingerprint = fingerprinting ();
15 nextEdge ();
16 start = performance .now ();
17 targetSecret ();
18 stop = performance .now ();
19 remain = nextEdge ();
20 duration = (stop - start) + (fingerprint -remain)/
fingerprint *grain;
21 }
22 total = 0;
23 function countFunc (){total ++;}
24 function callback (){duration = total*u;}
25 function sideChannelAsync () {
26 targetSecretAsync (callback );
27 setInterval (countFunc , u);
28 }
Figure 1: A Motivating Example.
can calculate the minor clock by dividing the granularity of major
clock by the number of executed operations. Here is the detail of
the attack. The nextEdдe function (Line 1–8) tries to find the next
edge of the major clock (per f ormance .now) and count the number
of executed operations towards the next major clock edge. For a
JavaScript fingerprinting attack (Line 9–12), one can first skip the
rest of the current major clock period (Line 11), and then calculate
the number of operations in a full major clock period (Line 12) for
fingerprinting. For a side-channel attack (Line 13–21), one can find
the fingerprint (Line 14), start from a new edge (Line 15), and then
measure a target secret using the major clock (Line 16–18). The
remaining cycles in the minor clock are counted (Line 19), and the
duration for the target secret is calculated by combining the minor
and major clocks (Line 20). Note that дrain is the granularity of the
major clock.
The asynchronous attack (Line 22–28) adopts an implicit clock,
e.g., setTimeout , setInterval or requestAnimationFrame , to mea-
sure an asynchronous target secret, e.g., the time to parse a third-
party response. First, the sideChannelAsync function (Line 25–28)
invokes an asynchronous target secret function—for simplicity, we
hide the details in the tarдetSecretAsync functionwith only a callback
function (Line 26). Then, the implicit clock is invoked via a setInterval
function with countFunc as a callback (Line 27). The countFunc
will be invoked periodically with a u interval until the callback is
invoked, i.e., the target secret finished execution. Then, one can cal-
culate the duration of the target secret based on how many times
countFunc is executed (Line 24).
Out-of-scopeAttacks. Wenow look at out-of-scope attacks. Par-
ticularly, we restrict the target secret in the timing attacks to be
browser-related and exclude these depending on other parties, such
as the web server and the user. Such restriction is natural because
we only make the browser deterministic but not others.
• Server-side timing attacks. In a server-side timing attack, a mali-
cious client infers a secret—e.g., some information that the client
cannot access without login—at the server side [13]. Examples
are that a user can infer the number of private photos in a hidden
gallery based on the server’s response time. To prevent such at-
tacks, one can rely on existing defenses [7] by normalizing web
traffic or changing the server-side code.
• User-related timing attacks. User-related timing attacks refer
to, for example, biometric fingerprinting, which measures the
user’s behavior, such as keystroke and mouse move, and identi-
fies users based on these biometrics. Many of such fingerprint-
ing tactics, such as keystroke dynamics, are also related to time.
Such attacks are out of scope, because the target secret, e.g.,
mouse move, comes from the user.
3 DETERMINISTIC BROWSER
In this section, we introduce several general definitions.
3.1 Concepts
Borrowing from Physics, we first introduce the concepts used in
our deterministic browser.
A reference frame (RF), in the context of our deterministic browsers
(referred as our context), is an abstract concept with a clock that
ticks based on certain criteria, e.g., the real-world physical time, the
execution of JavaScript, and the parsing of HTML. Concretely, we
can consider that a RF can be implemented via an OS-level thread
in web browsers, although there are no strict one-onemappings be-
tween threads and RFs in web browsers. Specifically, some browser
kernel threads may not be RFs and two threads, if one runs imme-
diately after another, may belong to the same RF.
Let us take a browser API, e.g., setTimeout or setInterval , and
its implementation in Firefox, as a concrete example of creating
RFs. The JavaScript engine of Firefox, a RF in our context, is run-
ning in the main thread of Firefox. When JavaScript code calls
setTimeout or setInterval under the window object, a new timer
thread—i.e., a new RF—is created. After the specified time in setTimeout
or setInterval passes, the timer thread will communicate with the
main thread with an event. That said, the concept of RF is natu-
ral and modern browsers have already provided implementations.
Note that althoughwe use Firefox as an example, the concept of RF
is abstract and general. In a multiple-process browser, like Google
Chrome, RFs could be represented by processes or threads in mul-
tiple processes.
The concept of RF defines a unit that is smaller than all other
web containers, such as HTML frames, origins, JavaScript runtime,
and browser tabs. The advantage of a RF is that we can easily sepa-
rate three key elements—an adversary, a target secret, and a refer-
ence clock—of a timing attack. For example, because a RF is singled-
threaded, i.e., can execute only one event, a target secret and an
implicit clock tick are separated in different RFs naturally.
For each RF, one important concept is called an observer. In our
context, an observer is defined as a Turing complete program that
can make observations, e.g., access the data belonging to the RF
or measure the execution status of itself. Some RFs have observers,
such as a JavaScript RF with JavaScript program, and some, such
as DOM RFs, do not. A RF with an observer is called a main RF,
and a RF without an observer an auxiliary RF. For the purpose of
defining determinism, we can consider virtual observers residing
in auxiliary RFs.
3.2 Definition of Determinism
Let us introduce the definition of determinism, which includes two
parts: (i) how to define a deterministic RF, and (ii) how to define
a deterministic communication between RFs. Next, we will show
how determinism can prevent timing attacks. Now we first define
a deterministic RF in Definition 1.
Definition 1. (DeterministicRF)Given a reference frame (RF )
and an observer (Ob)—no matter active or virtual, we define a RF as
deterministic if and only if the following holds:
When the Ob makes two observations O1 and O2 at timestamps
t1 and t2 measured by the internal clock, t2 − t1 can be represented
as a function of O1 and O2, i.e., t2 − t1 = f (O1,O2).
The core of Definition 1 is that when an observer makes obser-
vations, e.g., access the data of the RF or measure the execution of
JavaScript, the observer cannot obtain additionally timing informa-
tion other than what it has already known. In other words, based
on the observations in the RF, the observer can directly deduce the
timing, e.g., t2 − t1, without looking at the clock in the RF.
For the purpose of explanation, let us look at one toy example of
defining deterministic RFs. Specifically, the RF clock ticks based on
the following rule: Every time an integer variable x is incremented
by 1, the clock ticks by an atomic unit. This RF is deterministic be-
cause the clock is directly defined as a function of a variable, i.e., an
observation that the observer can make. As we can expect, this RF
can prevent timing attacks (assuming that external clocks are han-
dled by Definition 2 below). However, because the clock may not
tick if the observer does not increment it, browser functionalities
will be broken.
Beside the internal clock, an observer can also obtain other clocks
via RF communication. So we define a deterministic communica-
tion in Definition 2.
Definition 2. (Deterministic Communication) Given two
RFs (RF receiver , a deterministic RF, and RF sender , another RF) and
an observer (Ob) in RF receiver , we define the communication from
RF sender to RF receiver as deterministic if and only if either of the
following holds:
(1)When theOb from RF receiver makes an observation inRF sender
at the timestamp treceiver in RF receiver (i.e., a communication
from RF sender to RF receiver happens), at that moment, the times-
tamp tsender inRF sender equals to treceiver (tsender = treceiver );
(2) RF sender is deterministic.
Definition 2 gives two conditions for a deterministic communi-
cation between a sender and a receiver, i.e., either (1) two clocks are
synchronized or (2) both RFs are deterministic. Note that in order
to synchronize two clocks (i.e, the first condition), it is required
that the clock in the receiver is behind the one in the sender so
thatwhen the communicationmessage from the sender arrives, the
message can be delayed until the receiver reaches the time. Later in
Section 5, we will show that such condition can be easily achieved
by adjusting parameters in the clock of the receiver and putting
the so-called placeholder in the event queue of the receiver.
Now let us look at and prove Lemma 1 that connects Definition 1
and Definition 2.
Lemma 1. A deterministic RF remains deterministic after commu-
nicating with other RFs, i.e., following Definition 1, if the communi-
cation obeys Definition 2.
Proof. See Appendix A for proof. 
Now we can show our important theorem about determinism,
i.e., Theorem 1.
Theorem 1. (Determinism prevents timing attacks) If a RF
with a target secret is deterministic, an adversary observer—no mat-
ter in this RF or another RF—cannot infer the target secret.
Specifically, if the observer measures the endingand starting times-
tamps (tEnd and tSt ) of the target secret, the following holds: ∆t =
tEnd − tSt = const .
Proof. See Appendix B for proof. 
Theorem 1 says that the observer will always obtain the same
timing information when measuring the target secret. Specifically,
determinism normalizes the target secret so that the delta between
the ending and starting timestamps of the target secret, from the
viewpoint of an observer, is always the same, i.e., deterministic,
even if the target secret happens multiple times in different run-
time environments. In other words, we prove that determinism pre-
vents timing attacks.
4 REFERENCE FRAMES
In this section, wewill introduce how tomake RFs in current browsers
deterministic. The ideal yet simple solution is to make every RF de-
terministic, but such solution is impossible in some scenarios. For
example, a network message may contain the information about
the physical clock, and there is no way to make such RF determin-
istic (as it belongs to the external world). The good news is that
according to Theorem 1, we only need to make RFs with target se-
crets deterministic to prevent timing attacks. Now let us look at
several examples of RFs.
4.1 JavaScript Main RFs
JavaScript main RF needs to be deterministic because the perfor-
mance of JavaScript execution as shown in Figure 1 is a target se-
cret to the JavaScript itself. In this subsection, we start from some
background knowledge, present our core definition of a determin-
istic JavaScript RF, and then use Figure 1 as an example to show
how timing attacks are prevented.
4.1.1 Background. To execute a JavaScript program, a browser—
particularly the JavaScript engine part—will parse and convert the
JavaScript program into a special form called operation code (op-
code), sometimes referred as bytecode as well. Then, depended on
the execution mode, i.e., interpreter or just-in-time (JIT) compila-
tion, the opcode will be interpreted or converted to machine code
for execution.
Note that although the definition of opcodes is specific to the
type of the browser, such as Firefox and Google Chrome, deter-
minism can be associated with any set of opcodes. In our proto-
type implementation, we modified Firefox browser and thus used
the definition of opcodes in SpiderMonkey, the Firefox JavaScript
engine.
4.1.2 Deterministic JavaScript RF. We will give an alternative
definition of determinism in JavaScript RF in Definition 3. This al-
ternative definition for JavaScript is similar to the special defini-
tion [48] that researchers used in lower level, such as virtual ma-
chines. We will then use Theorem 2 to show that this definition
is equivalent to our general determinism definition of RFs (Defini-
tion 1) in the context of JavaScript engine.
Definition 3. (Deterministic JavaScript RF) Given a set of
opcodes (SO) generated from a program, a fixed initial state, and
a set of fixed inputs, a JavaScript RF is deterministic if and only if
the followings hold for any two executions (E1 and E2) on different
runtime environments:
For every opcode (op ∈ SO) in E1 and E2, t1op − t
2
op = C , where
tkop is the timestamp when the opcode op is executed in E
k , and C is
a constant related to only the starting time of E1 and E2.
Theorem 2. (Determinism Definition Equivalence) In the
context of JavaScript engine, Definition 3 is equivalent to Definition 1.
Proof. See Appendix C for proof. 
Now let us look at Definition 3, which says that JavaScript op-
erations in different executions of a deterministic RF will follow
a determined distribution pattern over time axis when inputs are
fixed and span over time in a fixed pattern. That is, if one makes
a translation from one execution to the starting point of another,
the two executions look the same.
There are twomethods to fix the execution pattern for JavaScript.
First, one intuitive method is to still use physical clock in this
RF but arrange the opcode execution sequence following a pre-
determined pattern. However, such arrangement will slow down
a faster execution, and cannot make up for a slower execution (as
the clock does not wait for a slower execution).
Second, what is being used in this paper is that instead of chang-
ing the execution, we change the clock in this RF so that the per-
ceived execution pattern from the viewpoint of the observer, i.e.,
the JavaScript program, is fixed, although we, such as oracle users
knowing the physical time, see the execution pattern differently.
4.1.3 An Example of Deterministic JavaScript RF. Given Defini-
tion 3, there are many possible clock definitions in deterministic
JavaScript RFs, which have no differences from the perspective of
preventing timing attacks. Now, considering simplicity and perfor-
mance overhead, we define a specific clock used in our implemen-
tation, which ticks based on the following criteria:
(i)When there are opcodes running, the clock ticks with regards
to the executed opcode. That is, we have the following equation,
tnow = tstar t +
∑
op ∈E JO unitop , where EJO is the set of executed
JavaScript opcodes and unitop is the atomic elapsed time for that
opcode. For simplicity, if we normalizeunitop asunit , we will have
Equation 1.
tnow = tstar t + countE JO × unit (1)
(ii)When there are no opcodes running, the clock can tick based
on any criterion, because there is no target secret in the JavaScript
RF—as JavaScript is not executing—and more importantly no ob-
server in the JavaScript RF measuring target secrets. One can con-
sider a JavaScript RF in this state as a blackbox that no observers
know what happens inside (thinking about Schrödinger’s cat). The
key for such state is that when another RF communicates with the
JavaScript RF, we need to synchronize clocks in both RFs (Defini-
tion 2). The reason is that when there exists communication, e.g.,
when a callback is invoked, an observer will be present. We will
discuss more details about the communication in Section 5.
The aforementioned clock makes JavaScript RF deterministic.
Assume that we have two executions of the same JavaScript at
t1star t and t
2
star t separately. For an arbitrary opcode op, we will
have t1op − t
2
op = (t
1
star t + countE JO ×unit) − (t
2
star t + countE JO ×
unit) = t1star t − t
2
star t = C , thus satisfying Definition 3.
4.1.4 Preventing the Synchronous Aack in Figure 1. Now let us
use Figure 1 to discuss how the synchronous attack (Line 1–21) is
prevented in JavaScript main RF. For the simplicity of explanation,
we assume that one JavaScript statement will form into one opcode.
In this case, the return value of the nextEdдe function (Line 1–6)
is always 1, because for each JavaScript statement (Line 4–6), the
clock of the JavaScript RF will tick forward byunitop , the unit time
for an opcode. Then, start is not equal to per f ormance .now() at
Line 6, and the function just returns 1 at Line 7. For JavaScript
fingerprinting, the f inдerprint is fixed as 1 (Line 11). For a side-
channel attack, there is only one opcode between Line 16 and Line
18. Therefore, stop−start equalsunitop , and f inдerprint−remain
equals 0, which makes duration as a constant number, i.e., unitop .
4.2 Auxiliary RFs
In this part of the section, we discuss how to make auxiliary RFs
deterministic. Similar to JavaScript main RF, an auxiliary RF needs
to be deterministic if it has a target secret. Now let us look at sev-
eral examples of auxiliary RFs. Note that this is an illustration but
not a complete list. Just as what Tor Browser [4] and Fermata [26]
did to add noise at various places, we also need to investigate the
same places (RFs) in browser and make them deterministic.
4.2.1 DOM Auxiliary RF. A DOM auxiliary RF is attached to a
JavaScript main RF: Such RF is created by the invocation of DOM
operation via JavaScript and destroyed when the DOM operation
finishes. We need to make DOM auxiliary RF deterministic, be-
cause the execution time of a DOM operation can be used to infer
the size of the resource involved in the operation [45]. The clock
in a DOM auxiliary RF will inherit from the JavaScript one, when
the DOM RF is created by the JavaScript. Then, the clock in the
DOM auxiliary RF will tick for a constant time, i.e., when the DOM
operation returns—no matter synchronously via a function call or
asynchronously via an event, the clock is incremented by a con-
stant time. Note that when there is no communication between
DOM and JavaScript, because there are no observers, the clock in
the DOM RF is in a uncertain state.
4.2.2 Networking Auxiliary RF. A networking auxiliary RF is
also attached to the JavaScript main RF. Networking auxiliary RFs
are created by an HTTP request, and destroyed by an HTTP re-
sponse, both initiated from the JavaScript main RF. Networking
auxiliary RF is deterministic for cross-origin requests, but remains
non-deterministic for same-origin ones. The reason is as follows.
If a request is from cross origin, the initiator, i.e., the JavaScript,
can infer the size of the response based on the time of processing
the response [45]. That is, the networking RF contains a target se-
cret. Specifically, the clock in such RF always ticks for a constant
time between the request and the response. As a comparison, if a
request is from the same origin as the JavaScript, the JavaScript by
any means has access to the response, i.e., there is no target secret
in the RF. Because an external server may embed the physical time
in the response, we will let the clock in same-origin networking
RF tick based on the physical time. Note that the communication
between same-origin networking and JavaScript RFs is still deter-
ministic per Definition 2 so that the JavaScript RF cannot obtain
the physical time.
4.2.3 Video Auxiliary RF. Video auxiliary RF is created when a
JavaScript renders a video on an HTML5 canvas as an animating
texture. According to Kohlbrenner and Shacham [26], such video
rendering can be used as an implicit clock via requestAnimationFrame ,
because most modern browsers render video in a 60Hz frequency.
That is, one can infer the physical time based on the current dis-
played video frame. We do not need to make a video RF determin-
istic, i.e., the clock in such RF ticks based on physical time, because
it contains no target secrets. Note again that the communication
between the video auxiliary and other deterministic RFs is still de-
terministic.
4.2.4 WebSpeechorWebVTTAuxiliary RF. WebSpeech andWe-
bVTT are another two venues of implicit clocks in the modern
browsers as mentioned by Kohlbrenner and Shacham [26]. A Web-
Speech RF with a SpeechSynthesisUtterance object is created by
a speak()method, and destroyed by a cancel()method which fires
a callback with a high resolution duration of the speech length. A
WebVTT is a subtitle API that can specify the time for a specific
subtitle and check for the currently displayed subtitle. Similar to
the video auxiliary RF, because there are no target secrets, both RFs
are non-deterministic and the clocks in these two RFs tick based
on the physical time.
5 COMMUNICATION BETWEEN RFS
In this section, we discuss, when one RF communicates with an-
other, how to synchronize clocks according to Definition 2. Before
explaining our technique, i.e., a priority queue, we first need to
understand how the RF communication works in legacy browsers.
The RF communication is handled by a so-called event loop [1],
in which a loopkeeps fetching events from a queue structure called
event queue. Let us again use setTimeout to explain the RF commu-
nication with the event queue. When the main RF calls setTimeout ,
themain RFwill dispatch an event into the event queue of the timer
RF, i.e., launching a communication from the main RF to the timer
RF. The timer RF will fetch the event, process it (i.e., waiting in this
example), and then dispatch another event, called a callback, back
to inform themain RF the completion of setTimeout , i.e., launching
a communication from the timer RF to the main RF.
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Figure 2: Mechanism of Priority Queue in the Main RF.
In our paper, we replace the event queue in the main RF with
a priority queue. Specifically, we reserve a callback place in the
queue for events that the main RF dispatched to other RFs. When
the callback is dispatched back to the main RF, the callback is syn-
chronized at the reserved place following Definition 2. Take a de-
terministic auxiliary RF for example. The duration of processing
an event in such RF always equals to a fixed value from the per-
spective of the main RF observer. To achieve that, the main RF pre-
assigns an expected delivery time for every callback as a priority in
the queue so that the callback will be only delivered at that specific,
fixed time from the viewpoint of the main RF observer. One impor-
tant property of this priority queue is that when multiple events
happen in many deterministic RFs, the queue will arrange all the
callbacks in a pre-determined, fixed sequence. Now let us look at
the details.
5.1 Priority Queue
Now let us look at how the main RF interacts with the priority
queue. Similar to the current event model, when the main RF is
idle, it will try to fetch an event from the queue. In our model, the
event with the highest priority, i.e., the one with the earliest deliv-
ery time, will be returned to and processed by the main RF. There
are two sub-scenarios (Case 1&2 in Figure 2) here. First, when the
expected delivery time is ahead of the clock in the main RF (called
the main clock), the browser kernel will move the main clock to
the expected time, and let the main RF process the event. Second,
when the expected delivery time is behind the clock in the main
RF (i.e., the main RF was processing other events at the expected
delivery time), the main RF will directly process the event without
changing the clock.
Note that both cases follow the deterministic definition of com-
munication in Definition 2. For Case 1, because two clocks are syn-
chronized at the delivery time, the communication is determinis-
tic. For Case 2, we can consider that the event is delivered at the
expected delivery time following Definition 2. However, because
JavaScript is a single-thread language, the main RF cannot process
the event when busy. That is, the main RF has to postpone the pro-
cessing of the event to the time when it is idle. Thus we can com-
bine the delivery and the processing, because even if the event is
delivered, the main RF cannot notice and process the event.
Besides normal events, there are two special events (Figure 2):
an event placeholder and a physical clock holder. An event place-
holder is a virtual slot indicating that a real event should be at this
place in the queue, but the event has not been finished in the aux-
iliary RF. When the main RF fetches an event placeholder (Case 3),
the main RF needs to pause its own clock and wait until the event
arrives or is canceled (e.g., timeout). If the event arrives, it will re-
place the event holder, and the main RF will process the event; if
the event is canceled, the main RF will process the next event in
the queue.
A physical clock holder is a mapping from the current physical
time to the main RF clock time. Because the physical clock keeps
ticking, the place of the holder also changes, i.e., the priority of
the holder will be lowered constantly. The usage of such holder is
two-fold. First, when an auxiliary RF with the physical time tries
to communicate with the main RF, the browser kernel will add the
event to the holder’s place in the queue. Second, in a very rare case
(Case 4), when the main RF tries to fetch the physical clock holder,
i.e., the main clock ticks faster than the physical one, the browser
kernel will pause the main RF until the main clock is behind the
physical one. The reason is that an event with physical time can
come at any time, and if themain clock is faster, the browser kernel
cannot synchronize the main clock with the physical one. To pre-
vent such scenario, we can set theunit in Equation 1 to a very small
number so that the main clock cannot catch up with the physical
one in the fastest machine.
5.2 RF Communication
We now look at how the priority queue can be used in the commu-
nication between RFs.
5.2.1 Main and Auxiliary RF Communication. Let us first look
at the communication between main and auxiliary RFs. First, say
the auxiliary RF is deterministic, and Figure 3 shows how it works.
Before creating such auxiliary RF, the main RF first put a place-
holder in the priority queue (Step 1). Because the auxiliary RF is
deterministic, the main RF can predict the expected delivery time.
Then, the auxiliary RF is started (Step 2) and keeps running until
it finishes and tries to deliver an event to the main RF. The event
will be put in the priority queue, replacing the previous placeholder
(Step 3). At the expected delivery time in the scale of themain clock,
the event is delivered to themain RF (Step 4). If themain RF is busy,
the execution might be delayed (Step 5). As mentioned, if the exe-
cution is delayed, the main RF can fetch the event at the delayed
time.
Second, say the auxiliary RF is non-deterministic. Examples of
such RFs include these created by the main RF (e.g., same-origin
networking RF) and these created by the user (e.g., mouse or key-
board RF). When such RF is created, because we cannot predict the
expected delivery time, no placeholder is created. If the auxiliary
RF tries to communicate with the main RF, i.e., an event is fired,
the event will be put at the place of the physical clock holder in
the priority queue.
5.2.2 Communications between Two Main RFs. We then discuss
how twomain RFs communicate with each other using the priority
queue, which follows Definition 2. There are two scenarios in this
communication: (i) the sender’s clock is ahead of the receiver, and
(ii) the sender’s clock is behind. First, when the sender’s clock is
ahead, the browser kernel can put the communication message,
i.e., an event, in the priority queue at the position of a future time.
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Figure 3: Communication betweenMain and Auxiliary RFs.
Then, when the event is executed, two clocks are synchronized—
everything is the same as the communication between a main and
auxiliary RF, and follows the first condition in Definition 2.
Second, when the sender’s clock is behind, the browser kernel
will put the communication event in the front of the priority queue,
i.e., deliver the event immediately. In such case, the receiver knows
two clocks, i.e., the sender’s and its own. Let us first consider that
the sender has a target secret, i.e., the sender’s RF is deterministic.
In such case, the communication follows the second condition in
Definition 2.
Let us then consider that the sender’s RF contains no target se-
crets and is not deterministic. An example is that themain RF is not
running JavaScript and just gets synchronized with an auxiliary RF
with a physical clock. Such case contradicts with our assumption
in the beginning that the sender’s clock is behind the receiver’s, be-
cause as shown in Section 5.1, relying on the physical clock holder,
the clock in a deterministic main RF, i.e., the one in the receiver,
is always behind the physical clock. Therefore, the scenario boils
down to our first case, where the sender’s message is put in the
priority queue, and both clocks are synchronized.
5.3 Preventing the Asynchronous Attack in
Figure 1
Now let us look at how the priority queue can help to prevent
the asynchronous attack (Line 22–28) in Figure 1. In one sentence,
when the adversary measures the duration of the asynchronous
target secret using the reference clock (i.e., setInterval in this ex-
ample), no matter how long the target secret takes to finish, the
adversary will always obtain a fixed, deterministic value.
Here are the details. In the sideChannelAsync function, when
the asynchronous target secret is invoked in function tarдetSecretAsync
(Line 26) say at tinit , the browser kernel will put an event place-
holder in the priority queue with an expected delivery time, say
at td , and create a deterministic RF to execute the asynchronous
secret. That is, td − tinit is a constant due to determinism. Next
when the setInterval function is invoked, the browser kernel will
create another RF for waiting and put an event placeholder in the
priority queue with an expected delivery time at tinit + u where
u is the variable at Line 27. Because the implicit clock introduced
by setInterval is to measure tarдetSecretAsync ,u should be much
smaller than td−tinit . That is, the event placeholder for setInterval
should be ahead of the one for the target secret in the priority
queue. Therefore, function countFunc (Line 23) is executed, and
then another event placeholder for setInterval is created. After
countFunc is executed for round((td − tinit )/u) times, the callback
for the target secret, i.e., callback , is executed. Note that if the tar-
get secret finishes execution, the placeholder for the target secret
is replaced by the callback, which can be executed immediately;
if not, the JavaScript RF will wait there for the placeholder to be
replaced by the callback.
In sum, we have three RFs in this example: JavaScript RF, DOM
RF for setTimeout , and a deterministic RF for executing the target
secret. The duration measured by callback is always round((td −
tinit )/u) ∗ u , a deterministic value. Therefore, the asynchronous
attack is prevented.
6 IMPLEMENTATION
We have implemented a prototype of deterministic browser called
DeterFox with 1,687 lines of code by modifying Firefox nightly
51.0a1 at 40 different files. The implementation is available at this
repository (https://github.com/nkdxczh/gecko-dev/tree/deterfox). Let
first look at the implementation RFs. As mentioned, legacy Firefox
already has RF implementations via OS level threads (xpcom/thread-
s/nsThread.cpp). Different RFs are different subclasses of nsThread,
such as TimerThread (xpcom/threads/TimerThread.cpp). Now we
introduce the core part of our implementation: deterministic JavaScript
RF and priority queue.
Let us first look at the deterministic JavaScript engine (js/src).
We associate a counter with each JavaScript context in SpiderMon-
key, the Firefox JavaScript engine of Firefox.Whenper f ormance .now
is invoked, the counter multiplying a unit time will be returned.
Note that some Firefox scripts, e.g., these with “chrome://” and “re-
source://” origins, are also running in the same context as JavaScript
from the website. We create separate counters for such Firefox
scripts. Here is how the counters are incremented. Specifically, Spi-
derMonkey has three modes of executing JavaScript code, one in-
terpreter (js/src/vm/Interpreter.cpp) and two just-in-time (JIT) com-
pilation modes (IonMonkey at js/src/jit/Ion.cpp and BaselineJIT
at js/src/jit/BaselineJIT.cpp). We increment the counter in all the
three modes. In the interpreter mode, the counter will be incre-
mented for each opcode; in both JIT modes, the counter will be
incremented based on the compiled JavaScript block. Our current
implementation does not add the counter in the compiled code
directly but before and after the compiled code execution. Note
that this implementation is still deterministic, because it makes the
JavaScript execution follow a certain pattern over time.
We then change the event queue for the deterministic commu-
nication. For each thread in Firefox, other threads can dispatch a
runnable to that thread and put (PutEventmethod in xpcom/thread-
s/nsThread.cpp) the runnable in the event queue (mEventsRoot
object in xpcom/threads/nsThread.cpp). Note that there are many
queues in Firefox, and these queues are sometimes hierarchical, i.e.,
one queuemay dispatch events to another queue. This event queue
that we talk about is directly associatedwith a thread, i.e., the inner
level queue.
7 EVALUATION
We evaluate DeterFox based on the following metrics:
Table 1: Robustness of Five Browsers against Different At-
tacks. (“Clock-edge” [26]; “Clock-edge-m”: an modified ver-
sion of “Clock-edge”; “Img (S)”: the image loading side-
channel attack [45] inferring two files with S size difference;
“Script (S)”: the script parsing side-channel attack [45] infer-
ring two files with S size difference; “Script-implicitClock
(2M)”: amodified version of “Script (2M)” using setInterval as
an implicit clock; “Cache attack”: a side-channel attack [38];
“Cache-m”: a covert channel modified from “Cache attack”;
“SVG Filtering”: the SVG filter attack from Stone [44].)
Chrome Firefox Tor Browser FuzzyFox DeterFox
Clock-edge [26] × × × X X
Clock-edge-m × × × × X
Img (100K) [45] × × X X X
Img (5M) [45] × × × × X
Script (100K) [45] × × X X X
Script (2M) [45] × × × × X
Script-implicitClock (2M) × × × × X
Cache aack [38] × × X X X
Cache-m × × × × X
SVG Filtering [44] × × × × X
Note:Xmeans the browser is robust to the aack, and × not.
• Robustness to timing attacks. We evaluate DeterFox and other
existing browsers including commercial ones and research pro-
totype against existing timing attacks presented in the litera-
ture.
• Performance overhead. We evaluate the performance overhead
of DeterFox from the perspective of a user of the browser, i.e.,
based on the physical time obtained from a standard Linux ma-
chine.
• Compatibility. We evaluate the compatibility of DeterFox us-
ing two tests: an automated browser testing framework called
Mochitest, and the rendering of Top Alexa websites.
7.1 Robustness to Timing Attacks
In this part of the section, we evaluate the robustness of exist-
ing browsers and DeterFox against timing attacks. Formal proof
about why a deterministic browser prevents timing attacks can
be found in Theorem 1. In this subsection, we focus on the em-
pirical evaluation of DeterFox and other prior arts against tim-
ing attacks presented in the literature. Specifically, four existing
browsers—namely Firefox, Google Chrome, FuzzyFox [26],4 and
Tor Browser [4]—are used for comparison, which range from com-
mercial browsers to research prototype. An overview of the evalu-
ation can be found in Table 1.
7.1.1 Clock-edge Aack. A synchronous version of the clock-
edge attack [26] is presented in Section 2. Apart from that ver-
sion, we also design another version specifically targeting Fuzzy-
Fox. The modified version runs an operation for a considerable
long time and calculate the difference between twoper f ormance .now
asynchronously. The attack is repeated for ten times to average out
the jitter added by FuzzyFox. Additionally, because twoper f ormance .now
are obtained asynchronously, they do not equal to each other ac-
cording to the FuzzyFox paper.
4FuzzyFox is a prototype implementation of Fermata, and we use the version down-
loaded from their repository with the default parameters.
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Figure 4: Script Parsing Attacks from Goethem et al. [45]
(We change the size of parsed scripts in the attack, and mea-
sure the time to trigger an “onerror” event. Each point in the
graph is the median value of nine repeated tests. Note that
all timestamps are obtained via JavaScript.)
The first two rows of Table 1 shows the results of both the orig-
inal and modified version of the clock-edge attack. All browsers
except DeterFox and FuzzyFox are vulnerable to the original ver-
sion, i.e, the minor clock can be used to measure a target secret
with µs accuracy. Both DeterFox and FuzzyFox will show a con-
stant time for the minor clock, making it unusable for measure-
ment of target secrets. For the modified version, all browsers ex-
cept DeterFox are vulnerable. We also test five browsers on the
clock-edge attack for the fingerprinting purpose (see Section 2),
and the results are the same as the one for the measurement pur-
pose.
7.1.2 Side-channel Aacks from Goethem et al [45]. We evalu-
ate the robustness of browsers against two side-channel attacks
from Goethem et al. [45], namely script parsing and image loading.
Both attacks try to load a file—which is not image or script and
from a different origin—and measure the time between the start
and when the “onerror” event is triggered. Details can be found in
their paper.
In the evaluation, we change the file size from 1MB to 20MB
and observe the loading or parsing time. The experiment for each
file size is repeated for 15 times, and we discard the first six results,
because the browser is sometimes busy loading system files during
startup, which affect the result. Then, we obtain the median value
of the rest nine results for each file size and show the result in Fig-
ure 4 and 5. Note that the file size we use is larger than the one in
Goethem et al. [45], because both FuzzyFox and Tor Browser add
noises to the loading or parsing time so that it is hard to differ-
entiate files with small sizes. However, the file size that we use is
still reasonable for normal web communications, such as for email
attachment. Now let us look at the results for script parsing and
image loading separately.
Figure 4 shows the results of script parsing attack for five browsers.
First, the parsing time for DeterFox is a constant, deterministic
number, i.e., DeterFox is entirely robust to the script parsing at-
tack. Second, the parsing time for both legacy Firefox and Google
Chrome is linear to the file size, confirming the results reported by
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Figure 5: Image Loading Attacks from Goethem et al. [45]
(We change the size of parsed scripts in the attack, and mea-
sure the time to trigger an “onerror” event. Each point in the
graph is the median value of nine repeated tests. Note that
all timestamps are obtained via JavaScript.)
Goethem et al. Lastly and more importantly, the parsing time for
both Tor Browser and FuzzyFox is a stair step curve with regards
to the file size. That is, both browsers can defend against such pars-
ing attack in small scale when the file sizes differ a little, but fail
when the file sizes differ a lot, e.g., with 2MB differences (Table 1).
Figure 5 shows the results of image loading attack for five browsers.
First, similarly the loading time for DeterFox is a constant, show-
ing thatDeterFox is robust to such image loading attack, and both
legacy Firefox and Google Chrome are vulnerable to the attack be-
cause the loading time increases as the file size linearly. Second,
the parsing time for FuzzyFox is still a stair step curve with a few
fluctuations. That is, FuzzyFox is also vulnerable to such attack
if the file size differs much, e.g., with 5MB differences (Table 1).
Lastly, the loading time for Tor Browser is interesting, because the
time stays as a constant number when the file size is below 4MB,
but increases linearly when the file size is above 5MB. That is, Tor
Browser is also vulnerable to the attack when loading a large file.
Note that in addition to using per f ormance .now to measure the
loading time, following the asynchronous attack in Figure 1, we
also tried setInterval as an implicit clock for the script parsing at-
tack with 2M file size difference. The result (“Script-implicitClock
(2M)” line in Table 1) shows that onlyDeterFox can defend against
the attack with the setInterval implicit clock—this is expected as
only DeterFox can defend against the original script parsing at-
tack with 2M file size difference.
7.1.3 Cache Aacks from Oren et al [38]. Oren et al. [38] pro-
pose a practical cache-based side-channel attack using JavaScript,
which can correctly recognize the website running in another tab
by creating a memory access pattern with zeros and ones called
memorygrams.We re-implement their attack and test all five browsers
against the attack. As shown in the seventh row of Table 1, both
Chrome and Firefox are still vulnerable, but Tor Browser, FuzzyFox,
and DeterFox are robust, i.e., the memorygrams in these three
browsers are all zero. Note that although Tor Browser was vulner-
able, people have patched Tor Browser to defend against this attack
by further reducing the time resolution.
Table 2: Measured Time to Perform an SVG Filter (All the
numbers are inms and averaged from 20 experiments).
Chrome Firefox Tor Browser FuzzyFox DeterFox
200×200 image 16.66 17.01 18.94 109.09 192
1920×1080 image 17.87 50.35 106.67 114.54 192
Because both Tor Browser and FuzzyFox only limit the band-
width of the side/covert channel, we create a modified version to
show that a covert channel is still possible (the eighth row of Ta-
ble 1). Specifically, we create two iframes from different origins
that talk to each other based on the cache attack for a long time.
The results show that if the attack lasts for two minutes, the re-
ceiver in both Tor Browser and FuzzyFox can successfully differen-
tiate the one-bit information. That is, the channel still exists with
significantly reduced bandwidth in both Tor Browser and Fuzzy-
Fox.
7.1.4 SVG Filtering Aacks from Stone [44]. Stone shows that
the performance of SVG filter can be used to differentiate the con-
tents of images. We apply the feMorphology SVG filter mentioned
in the Stone’s paper [44] to perform an erode operation upon two
images, one with size 1920×1080 and another with size 200×200,
andmeasure the operation time using requestAnimationFrame .Both
images are generated randomly with a mixture of RGB colors and
we perform the attack for 20 times.
The last row of Table 1 shows the summary results of the attack.
All other browsers except DeterFox are vulnerable, i.e., the mea-
sured operation time for the large (1920×1080) image is constantly
longer than the small one (200×200) as shown in Table 2. Based
on the results, an adversary can differentiate whether an cross-
origin image is a thumbnail or full-sized. By contrast, DeterFox
can defend against the attack—i.e., no matter how large the image
is, the operation time is always the same from the viewpoint of the
JavaScript observer. (The user can still tell the difference and will
not experience the slowdown as in FuzzyFox and Tor Browser.)
7.2 Performance Overhead
Wefirst evaluate the performance of DeterFox by JavaScript bench-
mark and Top 100 Alexa websites. Then, we discuss the evaluation
results.
7.2.1 JavaScript Benchmark. We first evaluate the performance
overhead of DeterFox using a JavaScript performance test suite
called Dromaeo [2], a unified benchmark from Mozilla. Each test
in Dromaeo is executed for at least five times and maybe up to ten
times if a significant level of error cannot be reached. Next, the
results are fit into a t-distribution to calculate the 95% confidence
interval. Note that because we changed the clock in DeterFox, all
the timestamps used in the experiment are based on the local time
of a Linux machine instead of the JavaScript time.
Figure 6 shows the evaluation results with the median overhead
of DeterFox as 0.63% and the maximum as 1% when compared
with the legacy Firefox of the same version. That is, the overhead
introduced byDeterFox is almost ignorable in terms of JavaScript
performance when observed by an oracle. In three of the test cases,
DeterFox is even slightly faster than Firefox because DeterFox
does not invoke any system calls during per f ormance .now , but
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Figure 7: CumulativeDistributionFunctionof LoadingTime
of Top 100 Alexa Websites. (Note that all timestamps are ob-
tained based on a standard Linuxmachine. Themedianover-
head is 0.1%, i.e., there is no statistical difference between
Firefox andDeterFox. The x-axis is cut off at 50ms, because
some Top 100 Alexa websites are located in China and the
loading time is very long, e.g., 1–2mins, and more impor-
tantly the loading time of such websites are dominated by
the network latency, i.e., unrelated to the browser. )
legacy FireFox does. If the measured time is very small, the invo-
cation of per f ormance .now will influence the result. Another in-
teresting experiment is to disable the JIT mode for bothDeterFox
and the legacy Firefox and test the performance overhead to show
the influence of the added counter. The results show the median
overhead for the interpreter mode as 6.1%.
7.2.2 Top 100 AlexaWebsites. We then evaluate the performance
overhead of DeterFox against Top 100 Alexa websites. Specifi-
cally, we measure the loading time of Top 100 websites in four
browsers and show the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of
the loading time.
Figure 7 shows the results of this experiment. The CDF curve
of DeterFox is very close to the one of legacy Firefox. The me-
dian overhead of DeterFox compared with legacy Firefox is 0.1%,
i.e., with no statistical difference. At contrast, both Tor Browser
and FuzzyFox incur a non-ignorable overhead. The reason is that
both Tor Browser and FuzzyFox add jitters causing a delays during
page loading, but DeterFox only adjusts the time in each RF, i.e.,
the time that JavaScript observes, while the user does not observe
similar overhead as JavaScript does.
7.2.3 Discussion. The overhead of DeterFox comes from two
parts: the counter and the priority queue. The counter brings over-
head because the incrementing behavior takes time. Further, the
overhead is small, because the incrementing behavior is very cheap.
The priority queue does not bring any overhead if there is only
one event waiting. When there are two (or more than two) events
in the queue, if the event—which DeterFox arranges behind the
other—comes first, the arrangement will cause overhead. However,
in practice, as shown in Top 100 Alexa websites, this case is rare,
and even if it happens the other event will also come in a short
time, which bring little overhead for DeterFox.
7.3 Compatibility
We evaluate the compatibility of DeterFox from three perspec-
tives: Mochitest, rendering Top 100 Alexa websites, and behind-
login functionalities of popular websites.
7.3.1 Mochitest. Mochitest [3] is a comprehensive, automated
testing framework from Mozilla, and Mozilla will use Mochitest
to test Firefox before each release. The entire Mochitest that we
use from Firefox nightly 51.0a1 contains 878,556 individual tests
grouped into 41,264 categories, and will run for 8 hours on a stan-
dard Linux virtual machine [5] downloaded from Mozilla official
website. Note that even the legacy Firefox cannot pass all the tests
on that virtual machine: Specifically, the legacy Firefox nightly
51.0a1 only passes 97.8% of tests—859,283 out of 878,556 as passed,
9,943 as OK, i.e., in their todo list, and 9,330 as failed.
Our evaluation results show thatDeterFox passes 97.6%of tests,
i.e., 10,339 as failed, 10,358 as OK, and the rest as passed. We look
at these failed cases and find that DeterFox fails additional 1,502
tests when compared with the legacy Firefox. Interesting, there are
493 tests that DeterFox passes but the legacy Firefox fails. One
possible reason is that DeterFox changes the sequence of events,
which may fix some concurrency bugs caused by rendering se-
quence. We look into some of these cases that DeterFox fails, and
find that they belong to many categories, such as DOM and layout.
7.3.2 Top 100 Alexa Websites. We evaluate the compatibility of
DeterFox by comparing the screenshot of DeterFoxwith the one
of legacy Firefox browser. Because modern websites contain many
ads, even two sequential visits to the same website may render dif-
ferently. Thuswemanually look at these websites in which the sim-
ilarity of the screenshots betweenDeterFox and Firefox is smaller
than 0.9 (A similar threshold to test browser compatibility is also
used in the literature [40]).
In total, 63 websites pass the initial test and we manually exam-
ine the rest 37. All the differences are highlighted automatically by
a red circle for manual inspection. The results show that all differ-
ences are caused by dynamic contents, such as a different ad and a
news update. In sum, DeterFox is compatible with Top 100 Alexa
websites, i.e., does not cause noticeable differences when rendering
the front page of these websites.
7.3.3 Behind-login Functionalities of Some PopularWebsites. In
this subsection, we evaluate the behind-login functionalities of sev-
eral popular websites. Specifically, we choose the most popular
website, according toAlexa, from several website categories includ-
ing email, social network, online shopping, video, and JavaScript
game. Our manual inspection shows that we can successfully per-
form corresponding actions. Here are the details.
• Email: Gmail. We register a new account with Google, log into
Gmail, and then send an email with an attachment to another
email address. From a different computer, we reply to this email
and attach another file in the reply. Then, from the first com-
puter, we receive the reply, look at the contents, and then down-
load the attachment in the reply.
• Social Network: Facebook.We register a new account with Face-
book, and log in. Then, we configure several privacy settings
following Facebook’s tutorial, and add several friends. Next, we
post a status in Facebook by sharing a news. We also talk with
a friend via Facebook message.
• Online Shopping: Amazon. We register a new account and log
in. Then, we browse several items using the search functions
in Amazon. Next, we add a book to our shopping cart, proceed
to checkout, and purchase the book with a newly added credit
card.
• Video: Youtube. We log into Youtube with the Google account,
and search several keywords. Then, we select a video, and watch
it for one minute. We also post a comment under the video, and
then delete the comment.
• JavaScript Game. We search the keyword “JavaScript Game" on
Google and click the first JavaScript game in the list, i.e., the fifth
item during our search. The JavaScript game is very similar to
gluttonous snake in which the gamer can control an item to eat
others. We play the game for one minute.
8 DISCUSSION
We discuss several problems in this section.
Access to Physical Time.One common misunderstanding of our de-
terministic browser is that JavaScript will lose access to the physi-
cal time. A deterministic browser only prevents JavaScript (an ob-
server) from accessing the physical clock when there is a secret
event running at the same time, because necessary conditions of a
timing attack involve an observer and a secret event (See Section 2);
at contrast, if there is no secret event execution, JavaScript has free
access to the physical clock. Specifically, the deterministic browser
kernel will fast forward the main clock in JavaScript to the phys-
ical one as discussed in Section 5. In practice, because JavaScript
is an event-driven language, if JavaScript is just waiting for one
single event with physical time, e.g., a network request from the
same origin, the main clock will be the same as the physical clock.
User-related Timing Attacks. As discussed in Section 2, our deter-
ministic browser, especially the current prototypeDeterFox, does
not consider timing-related biometric fingerprinting, i.e., the secret
event in our prototype is restricted to the browser itself. To defend
such biometric fingerprinting that is related to time, we need to in-
troduce determinism into corresponding reference frames. For ex-
ample, the clock in a keyboard reference frame needs to tick based
on the number of pressed keys instead of the physical clock. This,
however, is considered as our future work.
External Timers and Observers. In real-world, external timers and
observers, e.g., these that reside outside a browser, are impracti-
cal as pointed out by the FuzzyFox [26] paper. Any timestamps
or observations provided via such methods are too coarse-grained
to perform any meaningful attacks. Therefore, neither FuzzyFox
nor Tor Browser considers external timers and observers in their
thread model. Theoretically, a deterministic browser can defend
against such attacks performed by external timers or observers,
because according to Definition 2, two RFs are synchronized dur-
ing communication. That is, when an external observer obtains the
time or an internal observer obtains an external time, the time is
out-of-dated, which only reflects the synchronized time.
9 RELATED WORK
In the related work section, we first discuss existing timing attacks,
and then present prior work that mitigates such timing attacks,
especially browser-related ones.
9.1 Browser-related Timing Attacks
We discuss existing browser-related timing attacks below.
9.1.1 JavaScript Performance Fingerprinting. Mowery et al. [33]
and Mulazzani et al. [34] show that the performance of JavaScript,
i.e., how long a certain set of JavaScript code takes to execute, can
be used to differentiate, or called fingerprint, different types and
versions of web browsers. The reason behind such JavaScript per-
formance fingerprinting is that different browsers have different
JavaScript engine implementations and thus different runtime per-
formance behaviors.
9.1.2 Timing-based Side or Covert Channels. Timing attacks [23,
25, 32, 52, 53] in general have been studied for a long time. We fo-
cus on browser-related side or covert channels. Felten et al. [18]
first point out that due to the existence of web content caching, the
loading time of external resource can be used to infer the browsing
history in the past. Then Bortz et al. [8] classify timing channels
into two categories: direct timing attacks that infer private infor-
mation stored at server side, and cross-site timing attacks that infer
the size of a cross-site resource in the client browser. The former is
beyond the scope of the paper because the target secret is caused
by the server as discuss in Section 2; the latter is within the scope.
After that, Kotcher et al. [27] find another timing attack, showing
that the time of rendering a document after applying a CSS filter
is related to the document’s visual content. Similarly, Goethem et
al. [45, 46] show that the parsing time of scripts and video can be
used to infer the size of the corresponding resource. Oren et al. [38]
and Gras et al. [20] show that lower-level caching attacks can be
launched from the JavaScript without privileged access.
9.2 Countermeasures of Timing Attacks
We now discuss existing countermeasures of timing attacks.
9.2.1 Browser-level Defense. Tor Browser [4] and Fermanta [26]
are the closest work to our deterministic browser. Tor Browser [4],
an industry pioneer in fighting browser fingerprinting, reduces the
clock resolution to 100ms, and adds noises at all places to mit-
igate the browser’s fingerprintability. Similarly, Fermata [26] re-
duces the clock resolution and adds several pause tasks in the event
queue to reduce the resolution of implicit clocks. The main differ-
ence with DeterFox is that existing works only limit the attacks’
capability, e.g., prolonging the attack or reducing the channel band-
width, but do not fundamentally limit the timing attack.
Another difference between Fermata and deterministic browser
is that Fermata requires that all synchronous JavaScript calls are
converted to asynchronous because Fermata adds jitters in the event
queue. Such drastic changes will not be backward compatible with
legacy JavaScript program and their implementation, i.e., Fuzzy-
Fox, does not support such changes.
9.2.2 System-level Defense (based on Determinism). Both Stop-
Watch [29, 30] and DeterLand [48] use determinism to prevent
lower-level timing side or covert channels. Their virtual time ticks
based on the number of executed binary instructions in the virtual
CPU. Similarly, Burias et al. [9] propose a deterministic information-
flow control system to remove lower level cache attacks and then
Stefan et al. [43] show that such cache attacks still exist given a
reference clock. Aviram et al. [6] use provider-enforced determin-
istic execution to eliminate timing channels within a shared cloud
domain. Compared with all existing determinisms, apart from the
domain difference, i.e., browser v.s., lower level, the differences can
be stated from three aspects. First, the communication between the
virtual and outsideworld in existing approaches is non-deterministic,
i.e., they still add jitters or group event together to limit the band-
width of side or covert channels. Second, there is only one clock,
i.e., the virtual time, defined in existing approaches, while ourwork
introduces many clocks in different RFs.
9.2.3 Language-based Defense. Many language-based defense [22,
41, 42, 47, 50, 51] have been proposed to provide well-typed lan-
guage that either provably leaks a bounded amount of information
or prevents timing attacks fundamentally. Though effective, such
approaches face backward compatibility problem, i.e., all the exist-
ing programs need to be rewritten and follow their specifications.
9.2.4 Detectionof Timing Aacks. Many approaches [10, 19, 36]
focus on the detection of timing side or covert channels based on
the extraction of high-level information, such as entropy. Some ex-
isting work, namely Chen et al. [12], adopt determinism to replay
and detect timing channels via non-deterministic events. The dif-
ference between existing works in detecting timing attacks and
our deterministic browser is that such existing work is reactive,
i.e., waiting for timing attacks to happen and then detecting them,
while our deterministic browser is proactive, i.e., preventing tim-
ing attacks from happening in the first place.
9.2.5 Defense against Web Tracking. Some approaches, e.g., Pri-
Varicator [35] and TrackingFree [39], aim to prevent web tracking
in general. The purpose of these approaches is different from ours.
JavaScript performance fingerprinting is just a small component
of web tracking, and neither work can defend against JavaScript
performance fingerprinting.
9.3 Other Similar Techniques
We discuss some existing techniques that are similar to our deter-
ministic browser.
9.3.1 Determinism in General. Determinism is also used in de-
terministic scheduling [14–16, 31, 37, 49], such deterministic multi-
threading. Such techniques make the execution of programs, e.g., a
multithreaded one, follow a certain pattern so as to mitigate bugs,
e.g., concurrency ones. That is, they need to align execution se-
quence rather than adjusting the clocks. As a comparison, our de-
terministic browser not only align execution sequence as in deter-
ministic scheduling, but also adjust different clocks in RFs.
9.3.2 Logical Time. Logical time is also used in distributed sys-
tems to solve the problem of “happening before”, such as Lamport
Clock [28] and Virtual Time [24]. The purpose of such work is to
define a partial or total order of events so that causal dependency
can be correctly resolved. The reason for such logical time is that a
distributed system lacks a centralized management; by contrast, a
deterministic browser has a browser kernel to coordinate different
RFs with stronger clock synchronization than ordering events.
10 CONCLUSION
In conclusion, we proposedeterministic browser, the first approach
that introduces determinism into web browsers and provably pre-
vents browser-related timing attacks. Specifically, we break a web
browser down into many small units, called reference frames (RFs).
In a RF, we can easily remove one of the three key elements, i.e., an
adversary, a target secret and a reference clock, in timing attacks.
To achieve the removal purpose, we have two tasks: (i) making RFs
with a target deterministic, and (ii) making the communication be-
tween RFs—especially a deterministic RF with a non-deterministic
one—deterministic.
We implemented a prototype of deterministic browser, called
DeterFox, upon Firefox browser. Our evaluation shows that De-
terFox can defend against existing timing attacks in the literature,
and is compatible with real-world websites.
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A PROOF OF LEMMA 1
Proof. Let us look at the two conditions in Definition 2 sepa-
rately. First, if the clocks in both RFs are synchronized at the mo-
ment of the communication, the sender does not convey additional
timing information to an observer in the receiver. Therefore, Defi-
nition 1 is satisfied.
Second, if the sender is deterministic, the clock information can
be directly conveyed to the receiver. Specifically, we will show that
Definition 1 is satisfied in either clock or a mixture of both, which
makes the receiver’s RF still deterministic. Because the receiver is
deterministic in its own clock, we just need to consider the other
two cases.
(i) Since the sender is deterministic, following Definition 1, we
have Equation 2.
tsender
2
− tsender
1
= f (Osender
1
,Osender
2
) (2)
Because the sender can convey any information in the message,
bothOreceiver
1
andOreceiver
2
contain information aboutOsender
1
and Osender
2
. That is, we will have Equation 3, meaning that the
receiver is deterministic in the sender’s clock.
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(ii) We further show that the mixture of the sender’s and the re-
ceiver’s clock, i.e., tsender
2
− treceiver
1
, is deterministic. According
to Equation 3 and the definition of the receiver’s determinism, we
have Equation 4.
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When we minus the second equation in Equation 4 from the
first, we will have Equation 5.
(tsender
2
− tsenderstar t ) − (t
receiver
1
− treceiverstar t )
= f1(O
sender
2
,Osenderstar t )
− f2(O
receiver
1
,Oreceiverstar t )
(5)
After doing some transformations in Equation 5, we will have
Equation 6, following Definition 1 and showing that the receiver
is deterministic in the clock mixing both the sender’s and the re-
ceivers. Note that bothOsenderstar t and O
receiver
star t are constant.
tsender
2
− treceiver
1
= tsenderstar t − t
receiver
star t + f1(O
sender
2
,Osenderstar t )
− f2(O
receiver
1
,Oreceiverstar t )
= f ′′(Oreceiver
1
,Osender
2
)
(6)
In sum, if a communication from a sender to a receiver obeys
Definition 2, the communication does not break the determinism
in the receiver.

B PROOF OF THEOREM 1
Proof. According to Lemma 1, even if an adversary observer in
a RF obtains an external clock, the RF is still deterministic. There-
fore, without loss of generality, we only consider one clock in the
proof. There are two sub-scenarios: (i) an observer in a RF measur-
ing an internal target secret, and (ii) an observer in a RF measuring
an external target secret in another RF.
(i) Let us look at an observer in a RF measuring an internal
target secret. Let us assume that a target secret happens in two
copies (RF1 and RF2) of the same RF, e.g., the execution runtime
of the same JavaScript codewith the same inputs. An observer (Ob)
makes observations (ORF 1
{St,End }
andORF 2
{St,End }
) of the target secret
in these two RFs. We have the following Equation 7.
ORF 1
End
= ORF 2
End
ORF 1St = O
RF 2
St (7)
With Equation 7, we have Equation 8.
∆tRF 1 − ∆tRF 2 = (tRF 1
End
− tRF 1St ) − (t
RF 2
End
− tRF 2St )
= f (ORF 1
End
,ORF 1St ) − f (O
RF 2
End
,ORF 2St )
= 0
∆tRF 1 = ∆tRF 2 = const
(8)
Because RF1 and RF2 are arbitrary RFs, we show that ∆t =
tEnd − tSt = const
(ii) Let us then look at an observer in a RF measuring an exter-
nal target secret in another RF. Because according to Definition 2,
the clocks in both RFs are synchronized, the measurement that the
observer makes is the same as another observer, maybe virtual, in
the RF with a target secret. Therefore, the sub-scenario just boils
down the first one.

C PROOF OF THEOREM 2
Proof. We prove this theorem from two aspects:
• Definition 1⇒Definition 3: Say for two different executions (E1
and E2), i.e., two RFs in the context of JavaScript, an observer
makes two observations at the starting point (st ) of the execu-
tion and the timestamp of a specific opcode (op). According to
Definition 1, we will have Equation 9 and 10.
t1op − t
1
st = f (O
1
op ,O
1
st ) (9)
t2op − t
2
st = f (O
2
op ,O
2
st ) (10)
Then, we perform this operation (Equation 9−Equation 10):
t1op − t
1
st − (t
2
op − t
2
st )
= f (O1op ,O
1
st ) − f (O
2
op ,O
2
st )
⇒ t1op − t
2
op
= t1st − t
2
st + f (O
1
op ,O
1
st ) − f (O
2
op ,O
2
st )
= C
(11)
Equation 11 obeys Definition 3.
• Definition 3⇒Definition 1: Say there is a specific execution (Esd ),
i.e., a RF in JavaScript context, which can be used as a standard
for comparison with any other executions. The execution starts
from op1 to opn . For an arbitrary opcode (opi where i ∈ {1...n})
in that execution, we have the following Equation 12.
t
Esd
opi
=
∑
k ∈{1...i }
t
Esd
opk
(12)
For an arbitrary execution (Eab ), a replicate of Esd but at a dif-
ferent time, according to Definition 3, we have Equation 13.
t
Eab
opi
− t
Esd
opi
= C
⇒ t
Eab
opi
= t
Esd
opi
+C =
∑
k ∈{1...i }
t
Esd
opk
+C (13)
Now, say an observer makes two observations in Eab , which
corresponds to two opcodes (opi and opj ). We have Equation 14.
t
Eab
opi
− t
Eab
opj
=
∑
k ∈{1...i }
t
Esd
opk
+C − (
∑
k ∈{1...j }
t
Esd
opk
+C)
=
∑
k ∈{i ...j }
t
Esd
opk
= f (opi ,opj )
(14)
Equation 14 obeys Definition 1. Note that the last step in Equa-
tion 14 is due to that Eab is a replication of Esd and the obser-
vations in a JavaScript RF are the executed opcodes.

